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“Can the United Nations Unite Ukraine?” a February 2018 report from the Hudson Institute, written by Richard Gowan, non-resident fellow and research director at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation, and a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, proposes ways in which NATO could intervene in Ukraine without launching a formal NATO or EU mission in the country — which the author calls “politically inconceivable” at this point in time. “More credible alternative options include: an operation under U.N. command involving military, police and civilian components; a mission involving an independent military Multinational Force (MNF); and U.N.-led police and civilian elements,” he writes. He adds that the chosen option will have to ensure “a stable and secure environment throughout the Donbas,” enable “elections for representatives to the Ukrainian Rada in eastern Ukraine”   and supervise “public order and the civilian dimensions of reintegration.” 

“Defense Planning in a Time of Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of the 2001-2014 Quadrennial Defense Reviews, and Implications for the Army,” a Jan. 31, 2018, report from the RAND Corporation, analyzes the aforementioned years’  QDRs through the lenses of “organization and process, strategy development, force planning, modernization and transformation, resources, defense reform and infrastructure, risk assessment, and reception” and “identifies trends, implications, and recommendations for the Army and U.S. Department of Defense, in order to shape the conduct of and improve future reviews,” according to RAND’s website. “Most QDRs did not adequately address either the growing portfolio of demands on the force or risks associated with different end strengths and mixes of active- and reserve-component forces,” the site reads. “To avoid a similar outcome, future defense reviews should focus on assessing the adequacy of U.S. forces to support the chosen strategy at an acceptable level of risk and on characterizing the budgets needed to support those forces in the near, mid-, and long terms.” Learn more about the report here.”Most QDRs did not adequately address either the growing portfolio of demands on the force or risks associated with different end strengths and mixes of active- and reserve-component forces,” the site reads. “To avoid a similar outcome, future defense reviews should focus on assessing the adequacy of U.S. forces to support the chosen strategy at an acceptable level of risk and on characterizing the budgets needed to support those forces in the near, mid-, and long terms.”

“Navigating Dangerous Pathways: A Pragmatic Approach to U.S.-Russian Relations and Strategic Stability,” a January 2018 report published by the Center for a New American Security and co-authored by James Miller Jr., PhD, president of Adaptive Strategies and a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, and Richard Fontaine, CNAS president, offers “concrete recommendations for managing each of the three pathways” that their September 2017 report “A New Era in U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability: How Changing Geopolitics and Emerging Technologies are Reshaping Pathways to Crisis and Conflict” identified as having the potential to lead “to crisis or conflict” between the United States and Russia. “The aim is to help shape the ongoing debate regarding U.S.-Russian relations and guide actions affecting U.S. nuclear posture, ballistic missile defenses, cyber deterrence, and space resilience,” they write. “The recommendations also address the American role in NATO and NATO-Russian relations, both of which are of critical importance to all three pathways.”