Welcome to the CavasShips Podcast with Christopher P. Cavas and Chris Servello…a weekly podcast looking at naval and maritime events and issues of the day – in the US, across the seas and around the world. This week…we’re taking a dive into the world of uncrewed underwater vessels. First up will be a look from Carl Hartsfield at some of the innovative systems being developed at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in Massachusetts, then we’ll hear from Duane Fotheringham about a key manufacturing facility churning out REMUS UUVs.
Please send us feedback by DM’ing @CavasShips or @CSSProvision or you can email chriscavas@gmail.com or cservello@defaeroreport.com.
This Week’s Naval News:
Ships from the Chinese Navy and Coast Guard fired water cannons and maneuvered aggressively around Philippine Coast Guard and government vessels December 4 near Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, the Philippine government reported. Four Filipino vessels were confronted by at least four large Chinese Coast Guard cutters as well as two Navy frigates, the Philippines said, accompanying social media reports with videos of the encounters. It was the latest in a series of confrontations between the Philippines and China over ongoing territorial disputes in the region.
On December 6th, the US destroyer PREBLE carried out a freedom of navigation passage near the Spratley Islands in the South China Sea, passing directly through what the US Pacific Fleet called the “excessive claim area.” The region transited by the PREBLE is claimed by China, Vietnam and Taiwan. It’s the first US Navy surface transit of the Spratly Island region in just over a year.
Unconfirmed reports indicate the Russian naval force based at Tartus, Syria, may have evacuated the port, the website Naval News reported. A Russian Navy oiler was seen December 2 leaving Tartus, while indications suggest that the other ships normally based there – three frigates, a submarine and two auxiliary ships – may also have left. The Russian forces have been based in Syria for some years supporting the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. A surprise offensive by Islamist rebels has dramatically altered the tactical situation on the ground since early December, and the port is among those cities at risk of being overrun.
Chartered commercial tankers have begun refueling deployed US Navy aircraft carriers at sea, a direct result of the operational loss of the Military Sealift Command fleet oiler BIG HORN, damaged in a grounding incident in Oman in mid-September. The BIG HORN had been the only Navy oiler deployed in the region, and no others have been available as a replacement. It is highly unusual for a commercial tanker to be able to conduct such refueling operations at sea, but apparently that’s being done. Unofficially, sources have told this podcast the BIG HORN will not likely be repaired and instead face the end of her active service.
The US Navy destroyers O’KANE and STOCKDALE successfully defeated a range of Houthi-launched weapons while transiting the Gulf of Aden between November 30th and December 1st while the destroyers were escorting three US-owned and flagged merchant ships, US Central Command reported. There were no injuries and no damage caused by the attacks, which comprised three anti-ship ballistic missiles, one anti-ship cruise missile and three uncrewed aerial systems. For the STOCKDALE, it was the third Houthi attack in three months repelled during its current deployment.
The WASP Amphibious Ready Group returned to the Norfolk region December 6th, wrapping up a six-month deployment with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit. The amphibious ships WASP, OAK HILL and NEW YORK deployed with the 24th MEU from the US east coast in early June and operated mostly with US European Command.
The US Coast Guard on November 20th purchased the commercial icebreaker AIVIQ to operate as an interim icebreaker with construction of new Polar Security Cutters significantly delayed. Purchased from Edison Chouest, the AIVIQ is a US-built, 360-foot-long ship with a gross tonnage of nearly 13,000 tons that was first completed in 2012. The vessel now is undergoing a drydocking modernization overhaul in Tampa, Florida, and is expected to enter service in 2026, based at Juneau, Alaska.
In new ship news, a keel ceremony was held for the new fleet oiler THURGOOD MARSHALL T-AO 211 on December 5th at General Dynamics NASSCO’s shipyard in San Diego.
And the Virginia-class submarine ARKANSAS SSN 800 is to be christened December 7th at Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia.
Cavas Squawk:
The news this week from the Government Accountability Office about the US Navy’s amphibious force is pretty grim. Half the 32-ship fleet – 16 ships – are considered to be in, quote, “poor material condition” by the Navy itself, GAO reported. Ships are late leaving for deployments and suffering serious problems during those missions. The Marines, who depend on the amphibious fleet to deploy worldwide, have been scrambling to make things work amidst chronic Navy unreliability.
To those who follow the Navy and Marine Corps, this is not news. It’s been going on for years. The problems are widely known and acknowledged. And yet the problems seem to be compounding and getting worse. Certainly they are not getting better.
In any large organization there are always the Haves and the Have Nots. The groups that always seem to get the attention and support, and those who are perennially left out. In the Navy, the top of the apex arguably is the nuclear-powered fleet – aircraft carriers and submarines – followed closely by naval aviation and the Aegis fleet. Down towards the bottom are the mine warfare community, logistics forces and the amphibious force.
On this podcast, we have bemoaned all those have-not communities. They are less-than-totally-sexy yet important components upon which great fleets depend. When the need arises they round out the requirements of seapower – wide-ranging capabilities, presence, staying power and more. But it seems that it’s only when they’re broken do they get any real attention.
Amphib problems were highlighted in 2020 by the spectacular and incredibly shameful loss of the amphibious assault ship USS BONHOMME RICHARD, which burned for four and half days in the heart of one of the Navy’s largest bases in the middle of a major American city. When the fires were finally put out all that was left of this nearly three-billion-dollar ship was a burned out hulk, which was judged not worth repairing and subsequently scrapped. Two things were notably absent during this unprecedented fire: any sort of competence in fighting the fire and a distinct lack of outrage among Navy leaders – probably because too many of them were part of the problem to begin with.
Earlier this year, the Boxer Amphibious Ready Group’s scheduled deployment with the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit turned into a fiasco. Two of the group’s three ships – the BOXER and HARPERS FERRY – were unable to qualify to deploy for the group’s scheduled January 2024 departure from San Diego. Only the SOMERSET was able to meet the deadline. It took another two months before the HARPERS FERRY finally got underway in mid-March. The BOXER finally left San Diego on April 1, only to return ten days later with serious rudder problems – a situation that required another ten weeks to rectify. Meanwhile, the 15th MEU Marines scrambled, sending units from ship to ship, sometimes over great distances, to meet demands.
That, kids, is simply ridiculous. How many commands and activities failed to support these ships to get them out on time? Where should the blame begin? Where should it end?
The amphibious force has been a key element of US power projection since World War II, when a vast fleet carried warfighters to the far sides of the world to land Marines and troops ashore in the face of gunfire and win the war in Europe, North Africa and across the broad expanse of the western Pacific Ocean. The Marine Corps is built to continue that mission and depends on the Navy to get them to the fight – indeed the Corps’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concept fundamentally requires the Navy’s ability to conduct missions in contested maritime areas. Cargo ships don’t do that mission, ships taken up from civilian work don’t do that mission. But the Navy’s Gator Navy does. It’s conceived, designed and built for it.
GAO, as it does with its reports, offers a list of recommended actions. The actions essentially recommend adhering to established maintenance metrics and to stop postponing needed maintenance work. The Navy concurred with three of four recommendations and partially with the fourth. None of the recommendations are original, unique or a surprise.
The trick then, is to simply do the job.
